Interlude – From Relativism to Action

Up to this point, this book has largely adopted a relativistic position. Ethics is not regarded here as something given from outside humanity, but as a human construct shaped in part by evolution, culture, and the drive for survival. Moral values are not absolute; they vary between societies, historical periods, and circumstances. This perspective is not intended to be cynical; it is an attempt at honesty.

But anyone who follows this argument to its conclusion inevitably encounters a question that can no longer be avoided: if ethics is relative, why should we do anything at all? Why should we take care of the Earth rather than exhaust it? Why should justice be preferable to arbitrariness? Is the relativist not condemned to passivity — or worse, to indifference?

This is the classic objection to any form of moral relativism, and it deserves an honest answer.

Relativism Does Not Mean That Everything Is Equally Good

Recognizing that moral values are not absolute does not mean that all choices are equally valid. A relativist can distinguish between choices that, given certain human goals and values, contribute to the survival and well-being of people and ecosystems, and choices that undermine them.

A society that exhausts its soil, poisons its rivers, and pollutes its air will eventually experience the consequences in the form of disease, hunger, and conflict. That is not a moral judgment; it is an empirical observation. If we assume that we want human societies to survive and that we value health, well-being, and a livable environment, we can then say that choices that contribute to these goals are functionally better than choices that undermine them. Not because a higher power has determined that they are better, but because their consequences can be investigated and evaluated.

This, however, requires an important distinction. Facts themselves do not tell us what we ought to want. They show us what consequences certain choices have. The value we assign to those consequences — for example, preferring health to illness or survival to destruction — ultimately remains a human choice.

From Description to Action

Until now, this book has mainly described how human beings came to be what they are, how morality functions, and what paradoxes lie behind some of our deepest ideals. The following chapters take the argument one step further. They no longer ask only what human beings are, but also what they might do, given everything they know about themselves.

This step is not a betrayal of relativism. It is a possible consequence of it. Precisely because this approach does not assume a higher authority to show us the way, responsibility for our choices and the assessment of their consequences ultimately rests with human beings themselves. And precisely because we can regard morality as an instrument shaped in part by evolution and culture, we can try to use that instrument consciously. Not to proclaim absolute truths, but to live together on a planet that sustains us.

A relativist therefore does not have to fall into passivity or indifference. The relativist can act on the basis of the values that they and their society consider important, while examining the consequences of different choices as carefully as possible.

The difference is that the relativist does not have to present these preferences as universal truths given by a higher power. They can say: this is what we consider valuable, these are the consequences we consider important, and therefore we choose to act accordingly.